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The fiscal cliff, policy uncertainty and tax
reform
By Seth H. Giertz, University of Nebraska and Jacob Feldman, George Mason University 11/30/12 03:15 PM ET
The founding fathers purposefully designed a political system that perpetuates gridlock. Frictions
in political decision-making should foster stable policies. However, in recent years, this has been
turned on its head.
In recent decades, Congress has passed a series of budget control acts intended to impose
discipline on the budget process. These acts, by encouraging policy phase-ins, phase-outs and
expiration dates, have had the unintended consequence of policy uncertainty.
A growing literature is finding that policy uncertainty imposes substantial economic costs. Policy
uncertainty leads individuals to misallocate resources or to incur added costs from planning for
possible scenarios. Policy uncertainty, it is argued, leads investors to sit on the sidelines, rather
than bet on whether or how Congress will act.
In a newly released study by the Mercatus Center, we find that investors may do worse than sit
on the sidelines. We argue that policy uncertainty may decrease productive business activities,
like research and hiring, while increasing resources spent on unproductive investments, like
lobbying government.
We argue that policy uncertainty is a signal that government is open for business. With little
policy uncertainty, higher returns may be sought from investing in productive activities.
However, when government is receptive to policy changes, the returns from lobbying, political
action committees, etc. may be more remunerative. We believe that this may be yet another
important cost of policy uncertainty.

Our hypothesis builds on the work of William Baumol, who argued that entrepreneurship can be
divided into productive, unproductive, and destructive activities. Baumol chronicles great
innovations made over wide swaths of history, but notes that, in many cases, little effort was
made to disseminate these inventions to the masses or to use the inventions to increase
productivity. Baumol argues that political and cultural institutions play a key role in whether or
not innovations are geared toward improved productivity and economic growth. In many
preindustrial societies, the path to wealth was through rulers, and not the marketplace.
The fiscal cliff and chronic policy uncertainty in recent years underscore the need for
fundamental tax (and spending) reform. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was America’s most recent
fundamental tax reform. This reform closed loopholes, broadened the tax base, and lowered
rates. On the downside, it was susceptible to constant tinkering. In fact, the report of the 2005
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform noted that Congress had subsequently
amended the tax code approximately 15,000 times!
In their detailed review of the effects of the Tax Reform Act for the Journal of Economic
Literature, Alan Auerbach of the University of California and Joel Slemrod of the University of
Michigan concluded that “Even the simplification potential of radical tax reform depends on how
enduring a simple, broad-based tax can be, in the face of constant political pressure to
reintroduce special ‘encouragements’ or to redistribute the tax burden.” We argue that stability
and resistance to constant tinkering should be a first order considerations in any tax reform, and a
major lesson from the 1986 reform.
Giertz is an assistant professor of economics at the University of Nebraska and formerly worked
for the Congressional Budget Office. Feldman is a research analyst with the Mercatus Center at
George Mason University.

